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EDPL 4|2016 461Foreword by Paul De Hert
The Future of Privacy. Addressing Singularities
to Identify Bright-Line Rules That Speak to Us
Paul De Hert*
Technologies, Not Technology
Thinking about possible futures of privacy in a foreword is an open invitation to asso-
ciate freely and disappoint many. Let me try not to do both and to do honour to this
issue with papers of young scholars that are part of that future.
To apprehend the future of privacy I have opted for a controlled exploration of the is-
sue, mainly taking the form of delamination: an exploration or assessment of privacy
in a broad sense is not the object of this reflection.1 The focus is on technology-relat-
ed privacy. Is the future of (some aspects of privacy) dependent on the future of tech-
nology? What is then the future of technology? What technology brings the future and
what future brings technology? We know technology changes rapidly and we, law and
technology lawyers or privacy lawyers, update ourselves constantly, including on the
various technology-related concepts that come to us from other industries. One au-
thor sees a hype cycle at work with machine learning and blockchain currently peak-
ing in the ‘must understand’-lists of technology and big data having lost already all its
appeal.2
If there is such a thing as a disciplinary trait that characterizes law and technology
lawyers then it must be the sensibility for or openness to technological change. Look-
ing back at some decades in the profession, I can only acknowledge to have spent a
considerable amount of time listening in and reading on technological change. Always
the same? Nothing new? Loss of time? I don't think so, or rather I hope it isn't, but I
like to postpose a final assessment on the matter. More so, I prefer walking a danger-
ous line in terms of efficient time management by going into the detail of specific tech-
nologies, selecting some, ignoring others, bringing out specificities of a technology un-
der study compared to other technologies both in a technical sense and in a legal sense.
With great pleasure I have devotedmany years trying to understand developments with
regard to cameras and biometrics. I actually reached my limits with these two and ca-
sual invitations by colleagues to add a third technology to the study list, or to express
myself about other technologies, proved to be no simple assignments.
* Paul De Hert is full professor at the Vrije Universiteit Brussels (LSTS) and associated professor at Tilburg University (TILT).
1 See on bodily, intellectual, spatial, decisional, communicational, associational, proprietary and behavioral privacy, Bert-Jaap Koops et al, ‘A
Typology of Privacy’(2016 forthcoming) 38 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law.
2 Leo van der Wees, ‘Big data, big recht’(2016) 79(3) Computerrecht 145.
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Reflecting about the future in our area would mean for me first to reflect about tech-
nologies taken in their singularity. To clarify, I would like to draw a parallel with so-
cial sciences where in the 1980s Actor-Network Theory together with other schools
helped shift the focus away from traditional theories on power exercised by human ac-
tors and interactions between individuals and objectswith separately attributable prop-
erties that ‘exist in and of themselves’ towards concrete relations where humans and
non-humans associate and interact with each other. The idea of ‘the turn to technolo-
gy’ was born then and refers to the social shaping and construction of technology.
Twenty years later, Actor-Network Theory ‘radicalized’ its understanding of concrete
associations and power mechanism, mainly (but not solely) by extending its under-
standing of the concept of agency, with a role for non-human actors such as technolo-
gies.3 The assumption that non-human elements can be agents that come to existence
in associations with other human and non-human agents has proven to be a produc-
tive intuition, to judge the success of Actor-Network Theory today. Baron and Gomez
insist on the need to apply this broad lens, to better apprehend how technologies im-
pact or not society and collective action. Most research, in their view, by ignoring a
proper role for technologies or by exaggerating them produce deterministic or simplis-
tic perspectives on their subject matter.4
This message bears consequences for those working outside social science. Under-
standing relations, entanglements or impacts of a given technology on law or on val-
ues and fundamental rights starts with asking open questions about this specific tech-
nology. No two murders are alike, no two technologies are alike. The turn is to tech-
nologies, not to technology. The exercise should never be generic and go beyond su-
perficial observations. An example that comes to mind is what the European Court of
Human Rights seems to be elaborating in its surveillance case law: that communica-
tion surveillance is more troubling that camera surveillance and that within communi-
cation surveillance metadata surveillance and GPS surveillance are the less ominous
applications.5 The grounds for this calculus are unclear and we learn very little about
the singular technologies. A ‘good’ illustration could be an in-depth study of a given
camera, be it smart or not. For instance, what makes a camera smart? When do we
speak of a camera and when does a technology stop being a camera? Detection of
faces, ok, but what about detection of the human form, detection of specific events and
detection of specific behaviours. Many lawyers seems to privilege reasoning by analo-
gy: ‘something is novel but shares features with something that is known, hence we
will start from that…’. Perceived similarities are used as a basis to infer some further
similarity that has yet to be observed. There are positive accounts of analogical reason-
ing6 and there is little hope for the idea that this most ‘familiar form of legal reasoning’
3 See for a useful history of the ANT:Luis Fernando Baron and Ricardo Gomez, ‘The associations between technologies and societies: The
utility of Actor-Network Theory’ (2016) 21(2) Science, Technology and Society 129-148.
4 ibid 131. Their example is the study of social movements and social media.
5 Antonella Galetta and Paul De Hert, ‘Complementing the Surveillance Law Principles of the ECtHR with its Environmental Law
Principles: An Integrated Technology Approach to a Human Rights Framework for Surveillance’(2014) 10(1) Utrecht Law
Review 55-75.
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will be abandoned in the legal community (for a lack of rational basis): But it is undis-
puted that the method lacks analytical ambition, theoretical self-understanding and it
only shows primitive understanding of likely social consequences of important issues.
7 In legal practice, analogical reasoning can function as a way of not seeing or as a de-
liberate method to ignore concrete new entanglements between technologies and oth-
er actors. Assuming that a novel thing is similar and therefore identical to another thing
(‘a smart phone is just a phone’), has allowed courts to keep control (and very often
has served to extend law enforcement powers beyond their original scope). To identi-
fy strong and weak analogies and help dangerous analogies ultimately break down,
could be the baseline message here. What is needed in this world of growing particu-
larities is an expansive policy towards understanding relevant human rights and con-
stitutional provisions, combined with a strict constructivist approach when interpreting
the scope of governmental powers along the lines of Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute
on the International Criminal Court: 'The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed
and shall not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition shall be in-
terpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted.'
Let Technologies Come, We Have Data Protection Laws?
There are other legal methods in law than the use of analogies, not to see technolo-
gies at work in their particularities. One that comes to mind is adopting legal vocab-
ularies with very generic terms. Data protection law, for instance, has that capacity to
transform all action into one concept, processing, all actors into one or two concepts,
controllers-processors-data subjects, and to sweep all harm under the carpet by call-
ing it violations of personal data rules. In my opinion, we need a strong vacuum clean-
er for that carpet. A lot of dust is under it. A lot of singularities that we've lost.
Of course, there are advantages in labelling every new technology as a processing ac-
tivity of personal data and to focusing legal rules not on the former, but on the latter.
It saves a lawmaker work. There is always something new out there, but by applying
generic concepts law is not dismantled necessarily every time the hype cycle makes
a turn. Partly there is response here to the Collingridge 1980s alarm message about
law lagging behind technological change.8
There are positive things to say about this forward-looking capacity of data protection
law and its knights, its Don Quixotes that storm out on their Rocinantes whenever a
new technology approaches, even when the horses are exhausted.9 I will not use this
7 ibid.
8 Potential benefits of a new technology are widely accepted before enough is known about future consequences or potential risks of
regulating the technology from the outset, but by the time enough is known about the consequences and possible harms to enable
regulating it, vested interests in the success of technology are so entrenched that any regulatory effort will be expensive, dramatic and
resisted: ‘The social consequences of a technology cannot be predicted early in the life of the technology. By the time undesirable
consequences are discovered, however, the technology is so much part of the whole economics and social fabric that its control is
extremely difficult. This is the dilemma of control’ see David Collingridge, The social control of technology (Pinter 1980) 11.
9 David Barnard-Wills, ‘The technology foresight activities of European Union data protection authorities’ (2016) Technol Forecast Soc Change
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2016.08.032>.
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forum to list and identify data protection’s virtues to adapt to technological develop-
ments and to be forward-looking, but rather to focus on a negative aspect of these qual-
ities. It is not about the knight’s armature or about Rocinante, but about the fact that
the knight does not recognize the limits of his and his horse’s strength. It is perhaps not
data protection law as such but its use in the hands of the data protection authorities
that concerns me. These authorities, or DPAs as we call them mysteriously, handle in
good fate but they remain bureaucracies like all other government agencies. Theywork
with reason and rationality and a reasonable amount of efficiency to reach proclaimed
goals. Other agencies and other bureaucracies relate to that and adapt their own agen-
das. Data protection authorities have established themselves with success in the land-
scape of modern agencies and their usefulness is recognized by more and more pub-
lic and private partners. Interesting is the relationship with regulators. Our formal law-
making bodies (parliaments) are behaving just like any other bureaucracy: selective in
agenda setting and amending their own agendas in case of overlap or perceived con-
flict. ‘A new technology? That is not for us, the DPA will do it!’ 
I detect an attitude of unwarranted political delegation. Our representatives in parlia-
ment are delegating considerable responsibilities in terms of norm creation and devel-
opment to these DPAs, letting their expert voice overshadow basic political delibera-
tions. What am I talking about? Is there a problem? I believe so. Two examples.10 The
Dutch DPA in a series of recent recommendations has spelled out the rules for ‘cam-
eras’ understood very broadly: from ordinary CCTV cameras and cameras at the work-
space to cameras on drones, all regulated and just by one actor - the DPA acting as
our technology lawmaker. The website is a modernist dream: all problems of all cam-
eras dealt with under nine chapters. 11 However, the reading of the recommendations
troubles me. What is missing in the DPA’s work is self-reflection and evidence of an
understanding of its position in a wider constitutional landscape. Twenty years of read-
ing annual reports by DPAs vested in several countries have almost never allowed me
to identify such an understanding. One can only dream of seeing inserted now and
then a simple message, genre ‘this is a problem for fundamental rights, but we, as a
DPA cannot fix it and thus, we call for an intervention by the lawmaker’. Sign of weak-
ness for some, clear evidence of constitutional maturity for me. The more common
message (‘everything is processing of personal data, everything can be dealt with by
data protection law, we do not need to worry’) has lost much of its appeal.
A second example relates to biometrics. Applying data protection rules to biometrics,
as has been done in the past, only shows how easy it is to make a novel phenomenon
vulgar. Nothing does this job better than data protection law. Collingridge’s remark
about technology and law is still valid even in this era of data protection coverage:
biometrics were never considered seriously by any regulator in the countries that dis-
10 See for other examples such as profiling, Bert-Jaap Koops,‘The trouble with European data protection law’(2014) 4(4) International
Data Privacy Law 250-261.
11 Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens, ‘Cameratoezicht’ <https://autoriteitpersoonsgegevens.nl/nl/onderwerpen/cameratoezicht> accessed 12 December
2016 (only in Dutch).
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pose of the conventional data protection architecture. There are no specific laws in
Europe on biometric applications and certainly no clear messages about what biomet-
rics we want and what biometrics we do not want. This essential political exercise has
simply not been done, unless one considers the expert knowledge of DPAs on the mat-
ter to be a legitimate alternative for the kind of analysis we have in mind.12
This state of affairs is unsatisfactory. Human rights logic requires governments to act
and to protect human rights through the elaboration of an adequate legal framework.
That framework needs to be foreseeable and acceptable. General data protection laws
are a starting point, but do not offer the amount of foreseeability that is capable of tak-
ing into account all the differences regarding biometrics that can be identified.13A sep-
arate framework for biometrics would allow tackling its specific characteristics14 and
to impose technology-specific norms, such as prohibiting biometrical applications,
that are based on raw biometric data rather than on templates and to clarify norms,
such as subsidiarity for instance, in the context of large scale biometrical systems.
The Necessity of Bright-Line Rules
After Watergate, in the late 1960s, several Western countries updated their criminal
codes with anti-snooping and anti-spying prohibitions. Today, Watergate would only
result in some extra recommendations by DPAs (see what happened with the Snow-
den revelations). The plea here is not only about the need for genuine political delib-
eration, but also about the possible outcome of that process. What I'm looking for is
a role and a place in our legal system for bright-line rules. Rules that say what is and
what is not legitimate in a given decent society. Rules that are preferably simple or
simplifying and are based on selection and choice. Of course, this kind of rules can
preclude ad hoc balancing of interests, but this fact does not make them human rights
incompatible,15 or undesirable. To give one example of a much needed rule: ‘Drones
should not be for sale in regular shops’ (as they are now) or ‘Drones cannot be used
by citizens without license’ or ‘Use of Drones needs to be based on a warrant includ-
ing for police activities related to public order tasks’.
In previous writings, this constitutional task of drawing lines or of gatekeeping was
connected with the idea of creating zones of opacity in a given society and with the
need to distinguish the legitimate and the illegitimate.16 The idea was intuitive: to con-
sider the legitimate and to regulate it well, one has to identify at first the illegitimate
12 See critically on smart and reassuring governments that rely on expert knowledge provided for by specialised agencies, but forget to see their
citizens as just more than passive consumers, Alain-Gérard Slama, L'angélisme exterminateur (Grasset 1993) 241-245.
13 Paul De Hert, ‘Biometrics and the Challenge to Human Rights in Europe. Need for Regulation and Regulatory Distinctions’ in
Patrizio Campisi (ed), Security and Privacy in Biometrics(Springer Verlag 2013) 369-414.
14 In particular, we refer to its probabilistic nature creating the possibility of a false recognition or a false non-recognition, sometimes with
serious consequences for the data subject. New rights, respectful of fair trial and equality, need to be introduced
15 See for a ‘hard case’ on bright-line rules, Evans v United Kingdom App no 6339/05 (ECtHR). The Chamber’s decision of 7 March 2006 was
confirmed by the Grand Chamber’s decision of 10 April 2007.
16 Paul De Hert and Serge Gutwirth, ‘Privacy, data protection and law enforcement. Opacity of the individual and transparency of
power’ in Erik Claes, Antony Duff and Serge Gutwirth (eds), Privacy and the criminal law (Intersentia 2006) 61-104.
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and the unwanted. An ideal place for doing that is in criminal law codes, but other le-
gal areas qualify as well. Criminal law codes contain simple rules and threaten with
sanctions that speak to our imagination. The existence and enforcement of these rules
has a strong message-sending role or expressive function; stronger when compared to
civil or administrative enforcement.17 Data protection law today, with its focus on its
own problem-solving capacity and its preference for administrative enforcement, is
not well suited for this much needed demarcation of good and bad. Turning wrongs
into administrative law wrongs rather that criminal crimes or turning criminal law
crimes into administrative wrongs is transforming the social into the commercial,
Michael Sandel observes. By simply paying an administrative fine, a company can
solve its problem with no criminal public record to remind society about the wrong
done by a controller that has paid his fine. However, Sandel warns, the negative im-
pact on our moral compass should not be overlooked.18
When my neighbour sends a drone over my garden out of curiosity, he is committing
a wrong that needs to be clearly laid down in accessible terms. Fining the neighbour
with the argument that there has been a disproportional processing of data in viola-
tion of Articles 5 and 6 of Regulation (EU) 2016/679 will not do.19
Taking technology seriously means seeing technologies in their singularity. Under-
standing their good and bad aspects and their mediations and associations with other
actors should be based on a more ambitious attunement to these technologies. The
data protection architecture can help us in this task, preparing the grounds for a more
general political discussion about possible or probable effects, about undesirable ap-
plications and about the framing of desired applications.
(to be continued)
17 See Paul De Hert and Gertjan Boulet, ‘The co-existence of administrative and criminal law approaches to data protection wrongs’ in David
Wright and Paul De Hert (eds), Enforcing Privacy (Springer 2016) 357-394.
18 Michael J Sandel, What Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2012).
19 See more on the communication problem of data protection, Koops (n 10).
